The Supreme Court’s immigration docket has grown steadily over the past several years, producing decisions that ripple through visa processing, deportation proceedings, and asylum adjudications. For applicants, petitioners, and their families, understanding what these rulings actually changed - and what they did not - matters more than the headlines surrounding them.
Deportation and the Limits of Agency Discretion
The 2022 decision in Biden v. Texas addressed the “Remain in Mexico” policy, formally known as the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP). The Court held, 5-4, that the administration had legal authority to terminate MPP, reversing a lower court injunction that had required the government to reinstate the program. As a practical result, migrants who had been waiting in Mexico for U.S. immigration court hearings were no longer automatically required to remain there during proceedings. USCIS and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) then had to reprocess thousands of cases that had been held in limbo under the reinstatement order.
In Pereida v. Wilkinson (2021), the Court ruled 5-3 that a noncitizen seeking cancellation of removal bears the burden of proving they were not convicted of a disqualifying crime, even when state criminal records are ambiguous. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) Section 240A, cancellation of removal requires a noncitizen to show, among other things, that they have not been convicted of certain criminal offenses. Before Pereida, some circuits had placed the burden on the government to prove the conviction was disqualifying. After the ruling, immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) apply the burden to the applicant nationwide, meaning incomplete or unclear state court records now work against the person in removal proceedings.
The 2022 ruling in Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez narrowed mandatory detention rules under INA Section 1231. The Court held unanimously that noncitizens detained under Section 1231(a)(6) - those who cannot be removed because their home countries will not accept them - are not automatically entitled to a bond hearing after six months of detention. The Court left open whether the Constitution might independently require bond hearings in prolonged cases, but it rejected the statutory right that some circuit courts had read into the law. In practice, this means noncitizens stuck in detention because of non-cooperative countries - a group that includes nationals of countries like Cuba, Vietnam, and Eritrea - have a harder path to release while they wait.
Taken together, these three rulings illustrate a consistent pattern: the Court has generally declined to create procedural protections for noncitizens beyond what the text of the INA explicitly provides. Immigration attorneys representing detained clients must now build constitutional arguments separately, since statutory arguments have largely been foreclosed.
Asylum Law and the Definition of Persecution
Garland v. Dai (2022) addressed a technical but consequential question: when an immigration court record contains credible, uncontradicted testimony from an asylum applicant, must the BIA accept it as true? The Court held unanimously that no such automatic rule exists. Federal courts of appeals had used a “Ventura remand” standard to send cases back to the BIA when it failed to explain why credible testimony was rejected, but Dai clarified that courts may not simply presume all uncontradicted testimony is true. For asylum seekers, this means that even consistent, uncontradicted accounts of persecution can be weighed against other record evidence, and a denial does not automatically trigger a remand.
The question of what qualifies as a “particular social group” (PSG) under asylum law has not been directly resolved by the Supreme Court, but the Court’s 2018 ruling in Matter of A-B- (decided by then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions through his certification authority, not the Supreme Court itself) remains embedded in how immigration judges evaluate claims. The BIA and immigration courts applying A-B- have generally been skeptical of PSG claims based on family membership or domestic violence, though some circuit courts have pushed back. USCIS’s Asylum Division and EOIR continue to evaluate PSG claims on a case-by-case basis, and the outcome often depends on which federal circuit covers the applicant’s location.
In Wilkinson v. Garland (2024), the Court addressed the standard federal courts use when reviewing agency factfinding in immigration cases. The Court held 5-4 that the “substantial evidence” standard of review - under which courts defer to agency findings if supported by the record - is a statutory standard and not exempt from ordinary judicial review. This reopens the door for federal courts to take a harder look at whether USCIS asylum officers or immigration judges properly weighed the evidence, which could benefit applicants whose cases were denied on factual grounds.
Circuit courts have already begun applying Wilkinson to remand cases where BIA factfinding appeared to overlook material evidence. For applicants who received denials before 2024, this ruling could support a motion to reopen proceedings or a petition for review in the circuit court, depending on applicable deadlines under 8 CFR 1003.23.
The combined effect of recent asylum decisions is that evidentiary standards - what counts, who bears the burden, and how judges weigh it - have become the primary battleground in asylum litigation. Procedural facts like when an applicant first raised a claim, what documents they submitted with Form I-589 (Application for Asylum and Withholding of Removal), and how credibly they testified now carry outsized weight in both administrative and judicial review.
Agency Power and the Chevron Shift
Perhaps the most sweeping development affecting immigration law is the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which overruled Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council (1984). For four decades, Chevron required courts to defer to federal agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes. The Court ended that framework, holding that courts must independently interpret statutes without deferring to agency readings.
For immigration specifically, the consequences are still developing. USCIS, ICE, and the State Department have all issued policy guidance and regulations that relied on Chevron deference - interpretations of terms like “extraordinary ability” under INA Section 101(a)(15)(O), “specialized knowledge” under the L-1B visa category, or the definition of “exceptional hardship” in waiver applications. Federal courts reviewing these decisions may now substitute their own statutory interpretations rather than accepting USCIS’s reading. Petitioners whose O-1, EB-1, or L-1 visa petitions were denied based on restrictive agency interpretations of statutory terms may find stronger grounds for appeal in district court or the circuit courts going forward.
Practitioners filing Form I-140 (Immigrant Petition for Alien Workers) or Form I-129 (Petition for a Nonimmigrant Worker) should be aware that the legal landscape for challenging denials has shifted. The end of Chevron deference does not guarantee better outcomes, but it does mean federal judges will read the statute independently - and some have already read those statutes more broadly than USCIS has.
Consult a licensed immigration attorney for advice specific to your case and jurisdiction.
The most immediate practical step for anyone with a pending denial is to check the petition for review deadline under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, which for most removal orders requires filing within 30 days of the final order.
